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Abstract 
Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides a new legal basis for developing the 
European Union’s relations with its neighbouring countries. This contribution traces the origins 
of this provision and analyses its objectives and potential application in practice. It is argued 
that Article 8 TEU codifies the conditionality approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and introduces a differentiation with traditional association agreements for political 
reasons. The launch of the Eastern Partnership in May 2009, including the offer of concluding 
association agreements with the EU’s eastern partners, largely undermines the significance of 
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this distinction. It is, however, not to be excluded that Article 8 TEU is used in relation to other 
neighbouring countries, which are not interested in formal association with the EU.  
  
Introduction 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon significantly amends the legal framework of European Union (EU) external 
action. Apart from the much commented institutional innovations and the abolition of the pillar 
structure,1 the inclusion of a legal basis for the development of the Union’s relations with its 
neighbouring countries is of particular significance. According to new Article 8 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU):  
 
“1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on 
the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based 
on cooperation.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights 
and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation”. 
                                                          
1
 See: P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure. In Search of a New Balance 
between Delimitation and Consistency”, (2010) 47 C.M.L. Rev. 987. 
3 
 
 
This provision is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it provides a legal basis for a new 
type of bilateral agreements to be concluded on the basis of geographical and political criteria. 
Only “neighbouring countries” respecting the “values of the Union” are eligible for what is 
ambiguously called a “special relationship”. Second, Article 8 TEU does formally not belong to 
the Treaty provisions on EU external action but is part of the so-called “common provisions” of 
the TEU including the Union’s foundational values, basic objectives and fundamental principles. 
This position within the structure of the Treaties reveals the importance attributed to the EU’s 
neighbourhood relations but, at the same time, it raises questions about the concrete 
implications of this Article. Third, it is remarkable that the wording of Article 8 (2) TEU seems to 
be inspired by the traditional provision on the conclusion of association agreements, which is 
retained in Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).2 Hence, 
the legal implications of Article 8 TEU and, in particular, its relationship with the other Treaty 
provisions on EU external action are far from clear. In order to tackle those issues, this 
contribution traces the origins and objectives of this Article, analyses its legal scope and 
discusses its potential application in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), the EU’s Strategic Partnership with Russia and the relations with the Union’s “old 
neighbours” (EFTA countries and micro-States).  
 
                                                          
2
 Art. 217 TFEU (ex 310 EC) states that “The Union may conclude, with one or more States or international 
organisations, agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action 
and special procedure”. 
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The genesis of Article 8 TEU  
 
The idea to introduce a specific Treaty provision concerning the relations between the EU and 
its neighbours was launched within the European Convention during the preparation of a Draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. According to the travaux préparatoires, a 
separate title and an article on “the Union and its immediate environment” was deemed 
necessary to stress the importance to the Union of privileged relations with its neighbours.3 
This proposal cannot be disconnected from the general political context at that time. After a 
long and intensive period of pre-accession preparations, starting with the June 1993 
Copenhagen European Council and resulting in the finalization of negotiations with ten 
countries at the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council, the development of a proper 
neighbourhood strategy became a top priority for the Union.  
In a joint document, External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten and High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana proposed a new 
“proximity policy initiative”. Significantly, they explicitly suggested “to create new contractual 
arrangements such as Neighbourhood or Proximity Agreements”.4 The European Commission 
adopted this idea in its proposals for a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP aims to 
                                                          
3
 CONV 649/03, “Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment”, 2 April 2003 (available at: http://european-
convention.eu.int).  
4
 Joint Letter on Wider Europe by Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Javier Solano, 8 August 2002 
(available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf).  
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avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and the neighbouring 
countries that do not (currently) have an accession perspective. It is an ‘umbrella’ policy with a 
strong degree of differentiation, bringing together the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours in 
a single framework. The main objective is to open up certain sectors of the EU internal market 
for the ENP countries and to enhance political dialogue between the partners in return for 
substantive political, economic and legal reforms. The perspective of enhanced bilateral 
relations between the EU and each ENP partner country is complemented with specific regional 
and multilateral cooperation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 
2009) including the EU’s Eastern partners Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; the Union for the Mediterranean (the former Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or 
Barcelona process, re-launched in Paris in July 2008) targeting the EU’s southern neighbours 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestine Authority); 
and the Black Sea Synergy (launched in Kiev in February 2008) promoting regional cooperation 
among the Black Sea littoral states.5 
 In its first Communication on the ENP, the Commission announced the prospect of new 
Neighbourhood Agreements to upgrade the contractual relations with the Union’s Eastern and 
                                                          
5
 On 25 May 2011, the Commission and the High Representative issued the Joint Communication, “A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, COM (2011) 303, which confirms the ENP as a comprehensive policy 
framework for the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours. For more information: see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp.   
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Southern neighbours.6 In addition, it argued that “the EU should aim to develop a zone of 
prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood [...] with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and 
cooperative relations”. The parallels with the wording of Article 8 TEU are striking. Hence, 
despite the absence of any explicit reference to the ENP in Article 8 TEU, it is obvious that the 
discussions surrounding the elaboration of the ENP affected the final decision to include a 
specific Treaty provision on the Union’s relations with its immediate environment in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty.7 Reflecting the geographical extension of the ENP to the Southern 
Caucasus countries, which did not have a direct land or sea border with the EU, the final version 
of the Constitutional Treaty referred more generally to “the Union and its neighbours”.8 
                                                          
6
 Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Partners”, COM (2003) 104 final, 
11 March 2003, p. 17.    
7
 The explanatory note on “Title IX: the Union and its immediate environment” , published by the Secretariat of the 
Convention on 2 April 2003, states without any ambiguity that this provision “sets out the Union’s intention to 
establish a neighbourhood policy”(CONV 649/03). On the establishment of the ENP and its relations with the work 
of the Convention, see: E. Lannon and P. Van Elsuwege, “The EU’s Emerging Neighbourhood Policy and its Impact 
on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, in P. Xuereb (ed.), Euro-Med Integration and the Ring of Friends. The 
Mediterranean’s European Challenge (Malta: EDRC, 2003) pp. 21-51. 
8
 Compare Article 56 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CONV 850/03, 18 July 2003) with 
Article I-57 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ (2004) C 310/38. 
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Notwithstanding suggestions from several Convention members that such an article was 
either redundant or at least should be placed elsewhere in the Constitution,9 its position in the 
first part of the Draft Treaty was retained to highlight the importance of the EU’s 
neighbourhood relations. Moreover, this article preceded a title on Union membership and, 
accordingly, underlined the distinction between the ENP and enlargement as two separate yet 
equally important policies of the Union. The restructuring of the Treaties after the negative 
outcome of the ratification referenda in France and the Netherlands brought an end to this 
connection. The article on enlargement kept its numbering (Art. 49 TEU) and its traditional 
position under Title VI “Final Provisions” of the TEU. The article on the Union’s neighbourhood 
relations (Art. 8 TEU), on the other hand, was no longer awarded a separate title but was 
integrated under Title I “Common Provisions” of the TEU.  
It is obvious that the inclusion of Article 8 TEU is largely inspired by political and symbolical 
motivations. The Patten and Solana paper already acknowledged that “the strong symbolism of 
a new label that marks a strengthened commitment of the Union could help to raise the profile 
of relations with the EU and unlock additional political will and administrative capacity”.10 In 
line with this approach, the European Commission used the prospect of new contractual links, 
                                                          
9
 CONV 671/03, “Reactions to draft Article 42 (The Union and its immediate environment)”, 14 April 2003 
(available at: http://european-convention.eu.int).   
10
 Joint Letter on Wider Europe by Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Javier Solano, 8 August 
2002 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf).  
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in the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements, as an incentive within the ENP.11 
Remarkably, since the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, the Commission no longer 
applies the term “Neighbourhood Agreements” but rather refers to “Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreements” (DCFTAs), “enhanced agreements” and a new generation of 
“Association Agreements” (AAs).12 The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009 did not affect this evolution. For instance, on 15 July 2010, the EU launched negotiations 
on association agreements with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and negotiations on the 
conclusion of association agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are also still going on. Taking 
into account that the practice of association is nothing new in the external relations of the EU, 
the question arises what role Article 8 TEU can play within the context of the EU’s 
neighbourhood strategy. 
 
The scope and objectives of Article 8 TEU  
 
The wording of Article 8 (1) TEU reflects the objectives and conditions that have to be fulfilled 
before the Union can conclude a specific agreement with a certain category of third countries. 
In particular, the countries concerned have to be “neighbouring countries”, who are interested 
                                                          
11
 Communication from the Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper”, COM (2004) 373 final, 
12 May 2004, p. 9. 
12
 See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “On Strengthening 
the European Neighbourhood Policy”, COM (2006) 726 final, 4 December 2006 and Communication from the 
Commission, “A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy”, COM (2007) 774 final, 5 December 2007. 
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in a “special relationship” which is founded on the “values of the Union”, and aims at the 
establishment of “an area of prosperity and good neigbourliness” and is characterized by “close 
and peaceful relations based on cooperation”.  
 
Neighbouring countries of the Union 
 
The application of Article 8 TEU depends on explicit geographical criteria and is restricted to 
“neighbouring countries”. Taking into account the genesis of Art. 8 TEU it appears that this 
provision essentially concerns the target countries of the ENP (cf. supra). Significantly, the ENP 
itself has never been very clear in defining the specific scope of the notion “neighbourhood”. 
For instance, the very first ENP documents referred to the ENP as an external EU policy towards 
the Union’s “immediate neighbourhood” which implied third countries sharing a land or sea 
border with the EU.13 This explains why also the Draft Constitutional Treaty referred to the 
“Union and its immediate environment”. Later documents distinguished between 
“neighbourhood” and “immediate neighbourhood” and envisaged the extension of the ENP 
                                                          
13
 Communication from the Commission “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM (2003) 104 final). Also the European Security Strategy, endorsed at the 
European Council of December 2003, states that the EU’s task is to "make a particular contribution to stability and 
good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East 
of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative 
relations". 
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towards countries where the EU “has a strong interest in the stability and development” of the 
region.14  
Generally speaking, the ENP now brings together a variety of countries which are 
situated in the southern and eastern periphery of the Union.15 It is an ‘umbrella’ policy with a 
strong degree of differentiation, including the Southern Mediterranean countries of the ‘Union 
for the Mediterranean’ (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunesia and the 
Palestinian Authority) and the partner countries of the ‘Eastern Partnership’ (Ukraine , Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). In other words, the ENP is a flexible policy directed 
at countries situated in regions within a relevant proximity to the EU’s borders and of strategic 
political importance to the Union. This interpretation implies that the term “neighbouring 
country” is not exclusively defined on the basis of geographical criteria. The Southern Caucasus 
countries, for instance, are geographically speaking no immediate neighbours of the Union but 
are nevertheless included in the geographical scope of the ENP for political reasons.16  
                                                          
14
 Communication from the Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” COM(2004) 373 final. 
15
 Communication from the Commission “Taking Stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (COM (2010) 207 
final. 
16
 Whereas Georgia has a sea border with the Union since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, this is not the 
case for Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result of their geographical location, the three Caucasus countries were not 
included in the initial proposals on the ENP. This was changed for political reasons and after pressure on the part of 
the CFSP High Representative, the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus and the European 
Parliament. See: ENP Strategy Paper,  COM (2004) 373 final, pp. 10-11. On the initial discussions regarding the 
geographical scope of the ENP, see: Lannon and Van Elsuwege, “The EU’s Emerging Neighbourhood Policy and its 
11 
 
Apart from the ENP partners, nothing seems to prevent the potential application of Article 8 
TEU with regard to other neighbours such as Russia, the EFTA countries or the European micro- 
states. For the latter countries in particular, Article 8 TEU might become an interesting 
instrument to formalise their peculiar relationship with the Union.17 In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that a Declaration on Article 8 TEU, annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, explicitly provides that 
“[t]he Union will take into account the particular situation of small-sized countries which 
maintain specific relations of proximity with it”.18 This Declaration indicates that the 
geographical scope of Article 8 TEU is not necessarily restricted to the ENP partner countries 
but may be used as a passe-partout for designing the Union’s relations with other neighbouring 
countries as well.   
 
A special relationship with the Union  
 
Article 8 TEU pursues the objective of establishing a “special relationship” with the EU’s 
neighbours. The parallels with the traditional provision on the conclusion of association 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, in P. Xuereb (ed.), Euro-Med Integration and the Ring of Friends. 
The Mediterranean’s European Challenge (Malta: EDRC, 2003), pp. 74-76.  
17
 M. Maresceau, “The Relations between the EU and Andorra, San Marino and Monaco”, in A. Dashwood and M. 
Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations. Salient Features of a Changing Landscape 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2008) p. 305. 
18
 Declaration No. 3 on Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ (2010) C 83/337.   
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agreements, which is retained in Article 217 TFEU, are striking. The ambiguous and undefined 
notion of a “special relationship” is almost identical to the “special privileged links” which 
characterise the association agreements according to the Court of Justice.19 Moreover, the 
reference to “rights and reciprocal obligations” is drawn from Article 217 TFEU and the regular 
consultation foreseen in the last sentence of Article 8 (2) TEU is usually provided for under 
association agreements through the creation of a structural relationship (e.g. Association 
Council/Committee).20 Finally, the loose formulation of both Article 8 TEU and Article 217 TFEU 
allows for a high level of flexibility, which is a prerequisite to ensure sufficient differentiation in 
the relations with the various partners. As can be derived from the practice of association, the 
established privileged relationship can take several forms, ranging from little more than a free 
trade agreement to a level of integration that comes close to membership.21 The actual scope 
of the association depends on the outcome of the negotiations. The same flexibility applies with 
regard to the envisaged new generation of agreements under Article 8 TEU. Both provisions 
are, in other words, flexible legal instruments allowing for a variety of ties with states 
interested in a formal legal relationship with the EU.  
                                                          
19
 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para.9. 
20
 CONV 649/03, “Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment”, 2 April 2003. 
21
 Walter Hallstein, former Commission president, declared that “association can be anything between full 
membership minus 1% and a trade and co-operation agreement plus 1%”. Cited in D. Phinnemore, Association: 
Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) p. 23. 
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Arguably, the frequent use of association agreements in recent periods, which has resulted 
in a certain inflation of associated countries,22 explains the inclusion of a specific clause for the 
Union’s neighbours. This once again underlines the symbolic importance of Article 8 TEU as a 
label differentiating the EU’s special relations with its neighbouring countries from traditional 
association agreements. There is, however, no explicit or compelling link between Article 8 TEU 
and Article 217 TFEU. Article 8 TEU may even be considered as an alternative to formal 
association. In comparison to traditional association agreements, agreements based on Article 
8 TEU have a clear objective, i.e. “to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. This finalité is important 
because, from a political point of view, the conclusion of an association agreement with a 
European country is often perceived as a stepping-stone to EU membership.23 Article 8 TEU, on 
the other hand, leaves no doubt about the objectives of the established relationship and thus 
confirms the EU’s official position about the disconnection between ENP and enlargement.   
 
Founded on the values of the Union 
 
The EU’s external action in general and its neighbourhood relations in particular, are value - 
                                                          
22
 See : Gaudissart M.-A., “Réflexions sur la nature et la portée du concept d’association à la lumière de sa mise en 
œuvre”, in  Tchakaloff M.-F. (ed.), Le concept d’association dans les accords passés par la Communauté : Essai de 
clarification (Brussels : Bruylant, 1999) p. 3.  
23
 D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield, Sheffield Academic 
Press: 1999).  
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driven. Pursuant to Article 3 (5) TEU, the Union “shall uphold and promote its values” – laid 
down in Article 2 TEU24 – in its relations with the wider world. Article 8 (1) TEU applies this 
principle with regard to the EU’s neighbourhood. The reference to the “values of the Union” is 
not only a logical consequence of the EU’s ambition to act as a normative power in the world, it 
is also fully consistent with the strategy of the ENP. The 2004 ENP Strategy Paper underlines 
that “the privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitments to common 
values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human 
rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the 
principles of market economy and sustainable development.”25 All bilateral documents 
between the EU and the neighbouring countries (Action Plans, Association Agenda) emphasise 
the need for the latter to adhere to common values as a precondition for further enhancement 
of their bilateral relations with the EU.  
Significantly, the ENP policy documents all refer to ’shared’ or ’common’ values whereas 
Article 8 TEU explicitly refers to ‘the values of the Union’. This difference reflects the double 
function of values in the EU’s political discourse. On the one hand, the values of Article 2 TEU 
constitute the foundation of the EU’s identity; on the other hand, they are considered to be 
                                                          
24
 Pursuant to Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
25
 COM (2004) 373 final  p. 3.  
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universal.26 The abstract nature of values such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’ implies 
that they can easily be regarded as ‘shared’ or ‘common’. The key question is who decides 
about the interpretation of these values in a particular context. Within the framework of the 
ENP, it appears that common or shared values should be fundamentally understood as ‘the EU’s 
fundamental values and objectives’.27 For example, the EU is explicit that “the depth of the EU-
Ukraine relationship will be determined by the implementation of reforms and by further 
consolidation of common values”.28 In practice it means that any further enhancement of 
bilateral relations (liberalisation of visa regime, economic and trade cooperation) is strongly 
linked to practical adherence of Ukraine to the EU’s democratic and human rights values.  
In order to counterbalance the perception that the EU unilaterally imposes external 
conditions on the partner countries, the European Commission initiated the concept of ‘joint 
ownership’ as a key principle of the ENP. The idea that both the EU and the partner countries 
contribute to shaping and implementing the bilateral relationship is reflected in the procedure 
for the adoption of the ENP Action Plans and the monitoring of its implementation, which both 
occur within the bodies established under the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements or 
Association Agreements. However, this practice does not alter the essentially unilateral 
                                                          
26 
 P. Leino, R. Petrov, “Between 'Common Values' and Competing Universals: The Promotion of the EU's Common 
Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy”, (2009) 15 E.L.J. 654-671, at 655. 
27
 The 2004 European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper, for instance, explicitly provided that the ENP’s vision 
involves “a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s values and objectives”. COM (2004) 373 final, at p. 5.   
28
 See the Joint Press Statement of the 14
th
 EU-Ukraine Summit in Brussels on 22 November 2010 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/117912.pdf). 
16 
 
character of the ENP.29 The agenda of the Action Plans is primarily arranged by the EU and the 
evaluation of progress remains based upon periodic Commission reports. Despite the rhetoric 
of joint ownership, it is obvious that the Union is the dominant party in a relationship that is 
characterised by a strict conditionality approach. The neighbouring countries are required to 
implement a significant portion of the acquis communautaire and to launch ambitious political, 
legal and economic reforms under a ‘pre-accession’ type monitoring process carried out by the 
EU institutions.  
The EU’s common values represent an incentive for the implementation of this reform 
programme. The political elites of the neighbouring countries can refer to the ‘shared values’ 
enshrined in the Action Plans as objectives and benchmarks for further internal legal, political 
and economic reforms. It is noteworthy that the scope of value references included in the ENP 
Action Plans extends beyond the values of the Union as they are defined in Article 2 TEU and 
include references to democratic norms and standards developed by other international and 
regional institutions (United Nations, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Council of Europe, International Labour Organisation).30 Furthermore, various other elements 
                                                          
29 
M. Cremona and C. Hillion, “L’Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy”, EUI Working Papers, 2006/39, p. 20.  
30
 For instance, the ENP Action Plan with Georgia provides that local, parliamentary and presidential elections have 
to be conducted “in accordance with international standards, through implementation of OSCE/ODIHR and Council 
of Europe recommendations.” Moreover, Georgia is to “enhance support for the UN and the OSCE in order for 
them to carry out the implementation of their mandate, including in the field of human rights.” Finally, core labour 
standards have to be implemented “in accordance with relevant ILO conventions as ratified by Georgia.” (See: 
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which are not directly related to the traditional values have also been added to the list of 
commitments in the Action Plans, including, for instance, the fight against terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.31 In 
other words, the multiple references to shared and common values are instrumental to 
promote the EU’s own interests in different areas. 
The asymmetrical nature of the EU’s neighbourhood relations is enshrined in Article 8 
TEU. In principle, only partner countries respecting the EU’s values are eligible for a special 
relationship. The EU already applied this approach in the 1990s when it was to conclude the 
PCAs with the countries of the former Soviet Union. Only countries respecting the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights; guaranteeing the rights of minorities; accepting the inviolability 
of frontiers and committing themselves to a peaceful resolution of conflicts were considered 
eligible for this new type of agreements.32 This explains why the PCA with Belarus never 
entered into force after the establishment of an authoritarian regime by Alexander Lukashenko. 
A similar conditionality approach is applied with regard to the EU’s southern neighbours. The 
entry into force of an association agreement with Syria, for instance, is still pending due to the 
political circumstances in that country. Moreover, all the PCAs and Euro-Mediterranean 
association agreements contain an ‘essential element clause’ stating that respect for human 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf). Similar provisions can be found 
in the Action Plans with other ENP partner countries.  
31
 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, p.8. 
32
 C. Hillion, “Partnership and cooperation agreements between the EU and the Newly Independent States of the 
ex-Soviet Union”, (1998) 3 EFA. Rev. 399-415.  
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rights and democratic principles is an essential element of the agreement and a ‘non-execution 
clause’ providing that the parties may take appropriate measures in the event that the other 
party fails to comply with an obligation. A violation of the essential elements clause is 
considered to be ‘a case of special urgency’ allowing the parties to act without prior 
consultation in the joint council under the agreement. Obviously, this type of conditionality is a 
prerequisite for the conclusion of agreements under Article 8 TEU.  
It remains to be seen how the reference to ‘the values of the Union’ will be implemented in 
practice. A strict interpretation suggests that all the values listed in Article 2 TEU are to be 
considered as ‘essential elements’ of the bilateral relationship between the EU and its 
neighbours. However, proceeding from existing practice and taking into account the 
importance of joint ownership, it seems more likely to seek a common denominator in the form 
of international legal instruments. For the Eastern neighbours, the Council of Europe and the 
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe provide the common standards,33 for the 
Southern neighbours this will be the United Nations and other relevant international 
organisations.  
 
An area of prosperity and good neighbourliness characterised by peaceful relations based on 
cooperation 
                                                          
33
 For instance, the EU urges Ukraine to conduct its constitutional reform in close cooperation with the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe (advisory body of the Council of Europe composed of independent experts in 
the field of constitutional law). See the Joint Press Statement of the 14
th
 EU-Ukraine Summit in Brussels on 22 
November 2010. 
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Article 8 TEU envisages the establishment of an ‘area of prosperity and good neighbourliness’. 
These, at first sight, rather vague and broad terms have been frequently used by the EU 
institutions in the context of the ENP and the pre-accession strategies. The notion of 
‘prosperity’ is usually linked with ‘stability and security’. Whereas prosperity is mainly of an 
economic origin and is related to the well-being of the population, the notions of stability and 
security are closely associated with democracy and good governance and imply preserving the 
territorial sovereignty of the neighbouring countries.34 The concept of ‘good neighbourliness’ 
was introduced as a condition for accession in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1994 Essen 
European Council.35 It basically implies a commitment to resolve any outstanding (border) 
conflicts by peaceful means. Taking into account the close connection between the pre-
accession methodology and the ENP, it is no surprise that this concept has found its way to 
Article 8 TEU.   
The reference to ‘peaceful relations based on cooperation’ strengthens the perception that 
the objective of Article 8 TEU is not to prepare the (full) integration and (potential) accession of 
the neighbouring countries but, rather, to ensure close economic and political relations. Hence, 
despite the similarities with the Treaty provision on association, the final objective of Article 8 
TEU, i.e. close cooperation, resembles more the wording of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) concluded with the former Soviet Republics – with the exception of the 
Baltic States – in the period of 1994-1999. Accordingly, agreements based on Article 8 TEU 
                                                          
34
 Communication from the Commission ‘Eastern Partnership’ COM(2008) 823 final. 
35
 Presidency Conclusions Essen European Council (9-10 December 1994), Bull. EU (1994) 12, I.13.  
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appear to provide a pragmatic solution to upgrade the PCAs without entering into the politically 
sensitive area of association. It would, however, be inconsistent with both the rationale of the 
ENP and the idea of establishing a special relationship with the EU’s neighbours to suggest that 
forms of advanced integration going beyond mere cooperation would be out of the scope of 
Article 8 TEU.36 To the contrary, the possibility of undertaking activities jointly and the creation 
of reciprocal rights and obligations suggest a form of far-reaching integration based upon the 
export of the acquis to non-EU Member States. The only limit seems to be the exclusion of the 
neighbouring countries from the formal decision-making of the Union. This reflects Romano 
Prodi’s idea about “sharing everything but institutions” as a model for the EU’s neighbourhood 
relations.37  
 
The potential application of Article 8 TEU 
 
The specific characteristics of Article 8 TEU, including its position within the Treaties and 
political inspiration, raise questions about its potential applicability in practice. In particular, the 
procedural requirements and potential use in the EU’s relations with the ENP partner countries, 
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the Russian Federation and the so-called ‘old neighbours’ of the Union (EFTA countries and 
micro-states) deserve specific attention.  
 
Procedural requirements for the application of Article 8 TEU 
 
Taking into account the flexibility of its wording and its place within the structure of the 
Treaties, Article 8 TEU is essentially a framework provision and a declaration of intent. The 
clause remains vague as to the concrete substance of the EU’s neighbourhood relations and the 
added value in comparison to existing legal bases for the conclusion of bilateral agreements, in 
particular Article 217 TFEU on association, seems rather limited.38 Hence, the question arises to 
what extent Article 8 TEU can make a difference in the development of the EU’s relations with 
its neighbours. Is it, for instance, in itself a sufficient legal basis for the conclusion of a new 
generation of bilateral agreements with the neighbouring countries or does it always require a 
combination with the material legal bases included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)?  
In principle, nothing in the Treaties seems to prevent that Article 8 (2) TEU in itself is 
used to conclude a specific agreement with a neighbouring country. After all, Article 216 (1) 
TFEU makes clear that a legal basis for concluding international agreements can also be found 
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in the TEU.39 Moreover, Article 8 TEU can be considered as a ‘catch-all provision’, which does 
not require the determination of specific substantial legal bases but is, in itself, a sufficient legal 
basis for the conclusion of agreements of a general nature.40 In line with the practice of 
association, agreements based on the single legal basis of Article 8 TEU could cover any of the 
competences attributed to the Union. Taking into account the broad scope and importance of 
those agreements as well as their strong focus on political dialogue and conditionality, they can 
be expected to be mixed, requiring also the Member States to be a party to the agreement.  
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of a special type of neighbourhood agreements to 
be concluded on the single legal basis of Article 8 TEU, this option raises a number of practical 
and political questions. For instance, the procedure for the conclusion of agreements on the 
basis of Art. 8 TEU is not very clear. No procedural requirements are included in this Article, 
which implies the application of Art. 218 TFEU as the general provision for the conclusion of 
international agreements by the Union. While Art. 218 TFEU proceeds from the principle that 
qualified majority voting in the Council is the rule during this procedure, a specific number of 
areas require unanimity in the Council (i.e. when unanimity is required internally, for 
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association agreements, co-operation agreements with candidate countries and the agreement 
on accession to the European Convention of Human Rights). No explicit reference to 
neighbourhood agreements is, however, included. Based upon the close connection between 
the wording and rationale of Article 8 TEU and Article 217 TFEU it may be argued that the 
procedure for the conclusion of association agreements will need to be followed. This requires 
unanimity in the Council and the consent of the European Parliament.  
An alternative interpretation is that, given the absence of any procedural guidelines, Art. 
8 TEU cannot be used as an autonomous substantive legal basis. The symbolic nature of this 
provision and its unusual location under Title I ‘common provisions’ of the TEU seems to  point 
in the latter direction. This would render Art. 8 TEU into a mainly political instrument alongside 
the substantive legal provisions on EU external action in the TFEU.  
 
 Potential application in the EU’s relations with the ENP partner countries 
 
The option of specific agreements to be concluded with the ENP partner countries under the 
legal basis of Article 8 TEU might be interesting from an EU point of view because it provides for 
an upgrade of the EU’s bilateral relations which is consistent with the conditionality approach 
of the ENP and, most importantly, creates no false hope as far as accession prospects are 
concerned. However, the negotiations on a post-PCA agreement with Ukraine reveal that the 
partner countries are not necessarily interested in such a kind of relationship. From the outset, 
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the Ukrainian negotiators opposed against the use of the “neighbourhood” label.41 Only after a 
period of uncertainty about the legal status of what was diplomatically called an “enhanced 
agreement”, a Joint Declaration of European Commission President Barosso, the French 
Presidency and the Ukrainian President Yushchenko adopted on the occasion of the 9 
September 2008 EU-Ukraine summit made an end to the speculations when it announced that 
“the new agreement between the European Union and Ukraine will be an association 
agreement”.42  
The initial reluctance on the part of the EU to accept the association formula cannot be 
disconnected from the discussion about the recognition of the European aspirations of the EU’s 
eastern neighbours. Notwithstanding the absence of any automatic link between association 
and accession, certain Member States apparently feared that this would be perceived as a 
signal towards further enlargement in the future. The ultimate decision to work towards 
association in September 2008 can be explained by a growing pressure to support the pro-
European forces in Ukraine, on the one hand, and the absence of any viable alternative, on the 
other hand. At that time, Ukraine faced a serious political crisis as a result of disagreements 
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within the coalition of the Orange revolution.43 Moreover, the fate of the Treaty of Lisbon – and 
by consequence of Article 8 TEU as a potential alternative to formal association – was highly 
uncertain due to the negative outcome of the first ratification referendum in Ireland. Under 
those circumstances, the acceptance of negotiations on a proper association agreement 
seemed a logical step.  
Taking into account the frontrunner position of Ukraine in the Eastern neighbourhood, 
the new initiative on Eastern Partnership, formally launched with the adoption of the Prague 
Declaration on 7 May 2009, extended the offer of association to all Eastern neighbours. This 
evolution is remarkable. Whereas the ENP Action Plans, adopted between 2005 and 2007, all 
refer to the objective of neighbourhood agreements or, in the case of Ukraine, enhanced 
agreements, the EU now unambiguously accepted that the new legal framework will be based 
on association. Arguably, this shift in perspective has consequences for the legal basis of the 
new agreements. Whereas the idea of concluding “neighbourhood agreements” was clearly 
inspired by Article 8 TEU, the term “association” is related to Article 217 TFEU. Of course, given 
the similarities between both provisions, it may be argued that the EU can conclude specific 
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association agreements on the basis of Article 8 TEU alone.44 However, the absence of any 
specific reference to association in the wording of Article 8 TEU and the political interest of at 
least certain partner countries to be a formal associated country of the Union complicates this 
option. A potential compromise, satisfying the EU’s interest in developing a specific type of 
neighbourhood relationships and the partner countries’ ambition to become – or to remain in 
the case of the southern neighbours – formally associated countries of the Union, might be to 
seek recourse to the double legal basis of Article 8 TEU and Article 217 TFEU. This would at least 
clarify the institutional requirements for the conclusion of this new type of agreements. 
Whereas the combination of both articles might appear somewhat redundant, the reference to 
Article 8 TEU reflects the importance of the EU’s values as the foundation of the bilateral 
relationship and indicates that the objective is good neighbourliness rather than (potential) 
accession. The formal association on the basis of Article 217 TFEU, on the other hand, responds 
to the neighbours’ ambitions and sensitivities.  
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations will be, the choice of the legal basis for the 
new association agreements with the EU’s eastern neighbours (Article 8 TEU, Article 217 TFEU 
or a combination of both) essentially has a political significance. The flexibility of the Treaty 
provisions implies that the scope of a bilateral agreement is less dependent on its legal basis 
than on the political will of the EU institutions and Member States to engage in a far-reaching 
form of integration with a third country. As observed by Steve Peers, “a particular association 
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agreement might even contain fewer integration objectives than a partnership or co-operation 
agreement.”45 Also non-association agreements can contain at least some special privileged 
links and reciprocal rights. In Simutenkov, for instance, the Court of Justice accepted that also 
certain provisions of a Partnership Agreement are eligible to have direct effect.46 Moreover, 
agreements with a comparable content are sometimes concluded under the association 
formula and sometimes not.47 Hence, the classification of the EU’s agreements with third 
countries is mainly a matter of politics, not law.48 This political connotation is of particular 
importance in the EU’s neighbourhood relations.  
Taking into account that the Union already concluded formal association agreements 
with the southern ENP states in the past, anything less than association would not be perceived 
by the eastern ENP countries as an enhancement of their existing contractual relations.49 For 
the southern partners, on the other hand,  an upgrading of the existing bilateral relations is less 
obvious. Except for Libya and Syria, those countries already have a functioning association 
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agreement containing reciprocal rights and obligations and the possibility of undertaking 
activities jointly. Nevertheless, within the context of the ENP, the EU has offered some 
countries a perspective of further integration. On 13 October 2008, the EU and Morocco 
adopted a road map towards the establishment of an ‘advanced status’,50 a status that was also 
granted to Jordan in 2010 and is now offered to all Southern ENP countries in the context of the 
new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean”.51 The 
‘advanced status’ essentially implies a prospect of closer political relations with permanent 
consultation mechanisms, progressive integration in the EU internal market and enhanced 
sectoral cooperation. Even though this ‘upgrade’ of the bilateral relations is perfectly possible 
under traditional association agreements, the conclusion of a new generation of Euro-
Mediterranean neighbourhood agreements may make sense for political reasons.52 This is 
particularly the case in the wake of the Arab revolutions. In this context, Article 8 TEU and its 
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emphasis on ‘the values of the Union’ as the foundation for contractual relations provides an 
attractive point of reference to make a clear distinction with the current generation of Euro-
Mediterranean association agreements.  
 
Potential application in the EU’s relations with the Russian Federation 
 
In contrast to most ENP partner countries, which are interested in formal association and (far-
reaching) integration with the EU, the situation is different for the Russian Federation. In the 
Medium-Term Strategy for the development of its relations with the EU, Russia explicitly 
rejected the option of association.53 Obviously, the political connotation of association, 
suggesting an asymmetrical relationship between the partners which is based upon a strong 
conditionality approach and the unilateral approximation to EU rules and policies, is difficult for 
Russia to accept politically. For the same reasons, Russia refuses to take part in the ENP and 
prefers a bilateral Strategic Partnership outside the formal ENP framework. This involves a far-
reaching programme for the establishment of ‘four Common Spaces’, recently upgraded with a 
‘Partnership for Modernisation’, which potentially also offers deep and comprehensive free 
trade and a visa free regime. In contrast to the ENP, which is characterised by a strict 
conditionality approach and an asymmetrical nature of the bilateral relations, the EU-Russia 
Strategic Partnership is based on a more equivocal relationship. As an alternative to an ENP 
type of Action Plan, the EU and Russia jointly drafted road maps for the implementation of the 
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Common Spaces agenda.54  
Remarkably, the Common Spaces road maps avoid references to the one-sided 
approximation of Russia's legislation to EU standards but use more neutral terms such as 
‘regulatory convergence' or ‘the elaboration of common approaches'. This is an important 
evolution in comparison to the drafting of the PCA, which explicitly proclaims that “Russia shall 
endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the 
[European] Community”.55 Given Russia’s dissatisfaction with this provision as well as the need 
for an updated bilateral relationship after enlargement, the EU and Russia agreed at their 
Summit in Sochi (Russia) in May 2006  to develop a new, comprehensive framework agreement. 
After a series of problems with new EU Member States and after the conflict between Russia 
and Georgia, the negotiations officially started at the end of 2008.56 One of the key questions 
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concerns the legal basis of this new contractual relationship. At first sight, Article 8 TEU might 
be an interesting instrument to upgrade the PCA without entering into a formal association 
status. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the conditionality approach underpinning 
the ENP and reflected in Article 8 TEU is acceptable from a Russian point of view. The idea that 
the relationship is “founded on the values of the EU” may be difficult to reconcile with Russia’s 
insistence on equal partnership. 
Notwithstanding the consensus on an abstract set of common values,57 the 
interpretation of those concepts may be different. On several occasions, Prime Minister Putin 
and President Medvedev argued that the principles of democracy and liberty must be 
interpreted in line with Russia’s national values, in particular the aspiration to strengthen the 
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statehood and sovereignty of Russia.58 This implies, of course, a different reading of the events 
in Chechnya, South Ossetia or Abkhazia. The diverging perceptions between the EU and Russia 
are also obvious with regard to the legal protection of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia 
and Latvia. Whereas Russia regularly condemns what it calls the discriminatory treatment of 
the Russian-speaking population in the latter countries, the Union sees no problems and 
confirms the Member States’ full compliance with the EU’s values and norms.59 Hence, the 
value dimension may become a significant issue for the potential application of Article 8 TEU in 
the EU's relations with Russia. In any event, the agreement with Russia can be expected to 
focus more on issues of economic and political cooperation than the envisaged association 
agreements to be concluded with the Eastern ENP partners, which unequivocally aim at the 
export of the EU’s acquis.  
 
Potential application in the EU’s relations with the EFTA countries and micro-States 
 
Despite the observation that Article 8 TEU was conceived to provide a constitutional basis for 
the ENP and the development of specific bilateral relations with the EU’s new neighbours, this 
Treaty provision also potentially applies to the relations between the EU and its so-called “old 
neighours”: the EFTA countries and the micro-states. As a result of EU enlargement and the 
                                                          
58
 R. Petrov, P. Leino, “Between 'Common Values' and Competing Universals: The Promotion of the EU's Common 
Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy”, (2009) 15 E.L.J. 654-671, at 667-670. 
59
 P. Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic 
States’ Accession to the European Union (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) pp. 404-405.  
33 
 
further deepening of the European integration process, none of those countries can escape a 
growing pressure to align its legislation to that of the Union. Different models of close 
cooperation and (partial) integration already exist but it is not to be excluded that Article 8 TEU 
can play a role in a revision of the current structures.  
It is not very clear how Article 8 TEU could add something new to the EEA, which is 
formally an association agreement providing for the application of the internal market acquis 
and so-called “flanking policies“ (such as social policy, consumer protection, environment 
policy) in the EU’s relations with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.60 With regard to 
Switzerland, however, no comprehensive framework agreement exists. The legal relationship is 
based upon a network of more than 120 bilateral and sectoral agreements without an 
overarching institutional framework.61 This construction gradually developed as an alternative 
to the EEA, which was rejected in a popular referendum, and reflects the status of Switzerland 
as a very particular neighbour of the Union. However, it appears that the limits of this model of 
enhanced bilateralism are reached. The absence of a possibility to automatically adapt the 
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bilateral agreements to evolutions in EU law62 potentially undermines the uniform application 
of the acquis.63 Moreover, the existence of multiple Joint Committees complicates the efficient 
and coherent implementation of the relevant legislation. It is, therefore, no surprise that the 
option of concluding a comprehensive framework agreement to streamline the existing legal 
and institutional structure is contemplated.64 Recently, both the President of the European 
Council and of the European Commission hinted at the necessity of new institutional structures 
and also the European Parliament endorsed the idea of concluding “an all-encompassing 
bilateral agreement to the mutual benefit of Switzerland and the EU”.65  
Notwithstanding the difficulties to reconcile the EU’s insistence on the (quasi-)automatic 
implementation of new acquis and the Swiss political system of direct democracy, the 
perspective of a comprehensive framework agreement opens up a potential application of 
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Article 8 TEU. This provision could, at least symbolically, mitigate the perception that a new 
framework agreement is a step towards enlargement or a further erosion of national 
sovereignty. Of course, the distinction with a traditional association agreement is only political 
and the choice of a legal basis is a purely internal matter for the Union. In this respect, it is 
worth recalling that the Bilaterals I with Switzerland are already based on ex Article 310 EC (Art. 
217 TFEU). Even though the formal association of Switzerland had never been the subject of the 
bilateral negotiations, recourse to this legal basis avoided complex internal discussions about 
competence.66 The legal implications of this decision should not be exaggerated but it remains 
a bit odd that a third country can be “associated” without its prior consent. The introduction of 
Article 8 TEU with the Treaty of Lisbon at least provides an opportunity to clarify the finalité and 
context of the envisaged relationship. This may be important in the context of the political 
discussions surrounding the organisation of a ratification referendum in Switzerland.  
Declaration No. 3 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which 
adopted the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies the potential application of Article 8 TEU with regard to 
the micro-States.67 It is somewhat ironic that this declaration was included on request of 
certain micro-States themselves whereas the envisaged target countries of this new type of 
neighbourhood agreements, in the first place Ukraine and the other eastern neighbours of the 
Union, always remained very sceptical about this provision.68 In the preparatory stages of the 
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European Convention, Andorra and San Marino already announced an interest in closer 
cooperation with the Union. San Marino even suggested a possible application for EU 
membership.69 It is obvious that such a scenario would create serious institutional and legal 
complications for the EU. Hence, a specific form of privileged relationship in accordance to the 
terms of Article 8 TEU may be an interesting alternative reflecting the peculiar situation of the 
EU’s small-sized neighbours.  
   
Conclusion 
 
The introduction of a special Treaty provision for the development of the EU’s relations with its 
neighbouring countries is closely connected with the establishment of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and serves a number of political objectives. First, Article 8 TEU 
underlines that the Union is interested in privileged relations with its neighbouring countries 
and lays down the constitutional foundations for the development of the ENP. Second, this 
Article clarifies that the EU’s neighbourhood relations are based upon a policy of conditionality 
and respect for the EU’s values and norms. Third, Article 8 (2) TEU provides an opportunity to 
conclude a new generation of agreements with the neighbouring countries of the Union. In 
contrast to Article 217 TFEU, which remains silent on the concrete content and objectives of the 
established privileged relationship, agreements under Article 8 (2) TEU aim to establish “an 
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area of prosperity and good neighbourliness”. Hence, it may be argued that the introduction of 
Article 8 TEU essentially aimed to allow for an upgrade of the EU’s relations with its East 
European ENP partners without offering a traditional association agreement. The political 
connotation between association and (potential) accession, inspired by the experience of the 
Europe Agreements with the Central and East European countries that acceded to the Union in 
2004 and 2007 and the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the countries of the 
Western Balkans, explains this differentiation.  
The intention to offer a new type of European neighbourhood agreements as an 
alternative to ordinary association agreements faces a number of practical obstacles. Apart 
from the uncertain procedural requirements for the application of Article 8 TEU, it appears that 
the neighbouring countries are not interested in such a formula. Ukraine, in particular, strongly 
opposes any reference to the term “neighbourhood” or “neighbouring country” in the context 
of the ENP. Moreover, the special relationship envisaged under Article 8 lacks exclusivity. It is 
not at all clear what kind of specific benefits it offers to neighbouring countries in comparison 
to traditional association or even partnership agreements. The strong focus on conditionality 
and the vague reference to “good neighbourliness” make this new type of agreement not very 
attractive either. Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent the objective of creating 
“reciprocal rights” would allow the neighbouring countries to contribute effectively to the 
development of the bilateral relationship.70   
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Rather than providing a new type of integration arrangement, which stops short of 
enlargement but goes beyond existing forms of partnership and association, Article 8 TEU only 
institutionalises the ambiguity that also characterises the ENP.71 The introduction of a legal 
basis for concluding specific agreements with the neighbouring countries of the Union is 
essentially the result of a rhetorical exercise. This is clearly illustrated in the case of Ukraine and 
the initial reluctance on the part of the Union to negotiate a proper association agreement. The 
ultimate decision to negotiate full-fledged association agreements with all Eastern Partnership 
countries renders the original intention of Article 8 TEU virtually redundant. It is, however, not 
to be excluded that this provision is used in relation to other neighbours of the Union, such as 
Russia, Switzerland or the micro-States, which are not necessarily interested in formal 
association with the Union.  
From a legal perspective, the added value of having a specific legal basis for the 
development of a “special relationship with neighbouring countries” is not very clear because 
this type of privileged relations can perfectly be established under Article 217 TFEU. Moreover, 
the codification of the EU’s conditionality approach in its neighbourhood relations does not 
make a difference either, mainly because Article 3 (5) TEU already lays down that the Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and interests in its relations with the wider world. Hence, 
Article 8 TEU is essentially a political provision the significance of which for the practical 
development of the EU’s neighbourhood relations is questionable.  
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